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THE BROKEN PROMISES OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT AND THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ACT: CONFLICTING VALUES AND CONCEPTIONS
OF RIGHTS AND JUSTICE
JAMES A. GROSS*
I. THE PROMISES
In 1935 the Wagner Act' established the most democratic proce-
dure in United States labor history for the participation of workers in
the determination of their wages, hours, and working conditions.
Under the Wagner Act, the right of workers to participate in these
decisions was considered essential for social justice, and worker or-
ganization and collective bargaining were considered essential for a
free and democratic society. The Wagner Act also committed the fed-
eral government to the encouragement of the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining. Industrial democracy was to replace employ-
ers' unilateral determination of matters affecting wages, hours, and
working conditions. The Wagner Act, therefore, enabled a major re-
distribution of power from the powerful to the powerless at U.S.
workplaces covered by the statute.
Senator Robert F. Wagner often said that the National Labor Re-
lations Act was designed "to make the worker a free man."'2 He op-
posed the tyranny of both free-market laissez faire in which "men
bec[a]me the servile pawns of their masters in the factories," 3 and an
authoritarian "super government."'4 Wagner believed that ["t]he
struggle for a voice in industry through the process of collective bar-
gaining is at the heart of the struggle for the preservation of political
as well as economic democracy in America" and that if people "know
the dignity of freedom and self-expression in their daily lives ... they
will never bow to tyranny in any quarter of their national life."' 5
* Professor, Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations.
1. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69
(1994)).
2. Leon H. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 199, 215 (1960) (attributing the phrase to Wagner).
3. Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER Acr AFrER TEN YEARS 14
(Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945) (reprinting excerpt from Robert F. Wagner, The Ideal Industrial
State-As Wagner Sees It, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1937, at 23).
4. Id. at 13; see also id. at 12-14 (explaining Wagner's view).
5. Keyserling, supra note 2, at 216 (reprinting excerpt from Wagner, supra note 3).
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For Wagner, therefore, the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively was "at the bottom of social justice for the worker."'6 The Act
that bears his name was not neutral as between individual and collec-
tive bargaining; it expressly and intentionally encouraged collective
bargaining.7 The Act promised a protected opportunity for workers
to challenge the unilateral power of their employers and, through
power-sharing, to participate in making the decisions that affect their
workplace lives. When the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947,8
Congress left intact the Wagner Act declaration that it was the policy
of the United States to encourage the practice of collective bargaining.
In 1970 Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act
("OSH Act") 9 that committed the government to protecting workers
from industrial accidents and occupational diseases. The promised
right to health and safety is expansive and broadly defined: "to assure
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions."'10 Employers are required to "fur-
nish to each [employee] employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely
to cause death or serious physical harm to [their] employees."' 1 The
Secretary of Labor is required to set standards to ensure that "no em-
ployee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity
even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with
by such standard for the period of his [or her] working life.' 2 The
OSH Act pledges even more than the Wagner Act. It promises work-
6. James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years of NLRB
Law Making, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 7, 10 (1985) (reprinting excerpt from Robert F.
Wagner, Address at National Democratic Club Forum (May 8, 1937) as it appears in Keyserling,
supra note 3, at 13).
7. Section one of the National Labor Relations Act reads:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and elimi-
nate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment or other mutual aid or protection.
Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449-50 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
8. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 141-44, 167,
171-87 (1994)).
9. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1994)).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988); see also THOMAS 0. MCGARr-Y & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORK-
ERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRA-
TION 35 (1993).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1994).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994); see also CHARLES NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT WORK: T-i
RIsE AND FALL OF OSHA 2 (1986).
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ers a substantive right to safety and health and involves the state in
managerial decisions concerning actual conditions of work.
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz told Congress in 1968 that the
proposed health and safety legislation was a victory for a new politics
that "measure[d] progress in qualitative as well as quantitative terms;"
rejected "human sacrifice for the development of progress;" placed
"higher value ... on a life, or a limb, or an eye" and asserted "the
absolute priority of individual over institutional interests and of
human over economic values.' 13
II. THE PROMISES BROKEN
In his book, Death of a Yale Man, Malcolm Ross, the National
Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB's") Director of Information in
1937, described a Yale that for years advocated the "glories of a mate-
rialist world."'1 4 Ross feared that a concentration on "pleasant privi-
leges"'15 and an elitist paternalism would "mean [his] death as a
human being."'1 6 He decided he "would like to see America try de-
mocracy at whatever cost to comfortable people.' 7 He realized, how-
ever, what a fundamental and radical change that required: "And
because I know the strength of the opponents of authentic democracy,
I have decreed in myself the death of what I was."' 18
The men and women who worked in those early years to bring
the Wagner Act to labor relations in the field were dedicated to join-
ing in a great social movement to protect and advance the civil rights
of working men and women. NLRB personnel went into places and
situations that one characterized as "almost unbelievably foreign to
the America we see in smug prints."'19 The places ranged from Henry
Ford's giant 80,000 employee plant in Dearborn, Michigan, to a min-
ing company with operations scattered throughout such places as Jop-
13. NOBLE, supra note 12, at 82 (quoting Occupational Safety and Health: Hearings on H.R.
14816 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 90th
Cong. 17-18 (1968) (testimony of W. Willard Wirtz))..
14. MALCOLM Ross, DEATH OF A YALE MAN 383 (1939).
15. Id. at 385.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NA-
TIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937-1947, at 13 (1981) (quoting Interview with Louis G.
Silverberg (Mar. 6, 1970) (on file with the Labor-Management Documentation Center, Cornell
University School of Industrial and Labor Relations)).
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lin, Missouri; Galena, Kansas; and Picher, Oklahoma, to a family-
dominated mill town in Gaffney, South Carolina.20
One Board attorney who prosecuted the case against the Eagle
Picher Mining Company recalled "gaunt men with lead poison-
ing,.... lawyers identifiable 'by the fact that they wore jackets and
others went without,' and the day when he 'looked about .. .and
discovered ... that [he], the sole lawyer present, was the only man in
the room who had ten fingers on his hands."' 21 He had an uneasy
sense of privilege and of being "immune and shielded from" the
hazards and horrors of their way of life.22
Another NLRB Trial Examiner (as they were called then) went
to Gaffney, South Carolina where he found that two brothers, the
Hamrick brothers, controlled the mill, the town, and a thousand mill
hands-"their bodies and minds, their living and dying."'23 He saw
"characters right out of Tobacco Road-men, women, and young
folks, who can neither read nor write .... starving people and tired
land. Girls with yellow teeth-who chew snuff to keep the lint from
their lungs."'24 This Trial Examiner said it was "'heartrending' . . . 'to
see one witness after another come to the witness chair, start to tell his
[or her] story, catch Hamrick's glinting eye, and then stutter his or her
answers until courage return[ed].' ' 25 At the conclusion of his report
from Gaffney, the Trial Examiner made a prophetic remark: He won-
dered what would happen to these people "after the NLRB left town,
he hoped that their few minutes' say 'under the protection of the U.S.
Government' would 'permit them to dare vision a time when they can
demand social justice, for and by themselves.' ' '26
Only God knows what happened to those mill workers. But
given the history of the Wagner-Taft-Hartley labor policy we know
that labor never came close to achieving the system of industrial de-
mocracy envisioned by Senator Wagner and the law that bears his
20. See id.
21. Id. at 14 (quoting Interview with William J. Avrutis (March 19, 1969) (on file with the
Labor-Management Documentation Center, Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor
Relations) [hereinafter Avrutis Interview]).
22. Id. (quoting Avrutis Interview, supra note 21).
23. Id. at 14 (quoting Hearings Before the House Special Comm. to Investigate the NLRB,
76th Cong. 1795 (1940) (statement of Charles Whittemore) [hereinafter Smith Committee
Hearings]).
24. Id. at 15 (quoting Smith Committee Hearings, supra note 23, at 1796, 1800 (statement of
Whittemore)).
25. Id. (quoting Smith Committee Hearings, supra note 23, at 1796 (statement of
Whittemore)).
26. ld. at 16 (quoting Smith Committee Hearings, supra note 23, at 1934 (statement of
Whittemore)).
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name. The national labor policy toward unionism and collective bar-
gaining for most of the last thirty years has shifted from encourage-
ment and support to indifference or hostility.
Since about 1970 (with the exception of the current "Clinton
NLRB" and the four years of Jimmy Carter), the Wagner-Taft-Hart-
ley Act has been interpreted and applied by Republican-appointed
NLRBs whose decisions have protected management from union-im-
posed limits on its freedom to manage and strengthened the manage-
rial authority of employers who already had great power over their
employees. That development, together with the decline of unionism,
leaves unprotected the great majority of employees who do not have
sufficient individual economic and political power to protect them-
selves. Almost sixty years after the Wagner Act, the overwhelming
majority of employees are unorganized and unrepresented and work
unprotected by grievance and arbitration systems in situations where
they may be fired at will for almost any reason.
Near the end of 1984, as the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") approached its fiftieth birthday, the House Committee on
Education and Labor's Subcommittee on Labor-Management Rela-
tions reported its "unmistakable conclusion" that "labor law has
failed. '27 By failure, the committee meant that the Taft-Hartley Act
had not achieved its purpose of encouraging collective bargaining and
protecting employees from discrimination because of their views on
unionization.28 On the contrary, the subcommittee said that the Act
was being used "as a weapon to obstruct collective bargaining" 29 and
to create only the illusion of protecting workers against discrimina-
tion.30 After fifty years of Wagner and Taft-Hartley, workers and un-
ions were "being badly betrayed."' 31
The Republican minority on that committee accused the majority
of hyperbolic election-year rhetoric. 32 The minority's statement of the
purposes of the Act proclaimed the promotion of commerce as the
preeminent statutory objective and relegated collective bargaining to
a subordinate means of facilitating commerce. 33 Congressional intent
27. SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
EDUC. AND LABOR, 98TH CONG., THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAw-A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN
WORKERS 1 (Comm. Print 1984).
28. See id.
29. Id. at 24.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 27.
33. See id. at 28.
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was not being served, the Republican minority concluded, whenever
collective bargaining "unacceptably obstructed" the free flow of com-
merce.34 Yet, the more collective bargaining was subordinated to the
economic interests of employers, the more irrelevant and fraudulent
the Act became.
After over twenty-five years of the OSH Act, neither the Act nor
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") have
lived up to the noble intention of protecting workers from dangerous
and disabling workplace conditions. It is shameful that "the United
States still lacks comprehensive and accurate data on" workplace inju-
ries and workplace-related diseases and illnesses.35 The best available
numbers, however, confirm that workplaces remain very dangerous.
The Office of Technology Assessment estimates that up to 100,000
workers die each year from occupational disease and that 6000 work-
ers die annually in work-related accidents. 36 The Bureau of Labor
Statistics' first national Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (that re-
lied on multiple sources such as death certificates, coroner and medi-
cal examiner reports, and other reports from workers' compensation
and state motor vehicle agencies, OSHA, and the news media) re-
corded 4867 accidental workforce fatalities in 1992.37 The National
Safety Council recorded a total of 8500 work-related fatalities for the
same year.38 The correct figure according to those who compiled
these statistics "lie[s] somewhere between the two."'39
No political administration has taken seriously the statutorily
promised rights to occupational health and safety. In the words of one
critic, OSHA sanctions reveal "an accommodation with human ex-
34. Id.
35. Marc Linder, Fatal Subtraction: Statistical MIAs on the Industrial Battlefield, 10 J. LEGIS.
99, 100 (1994); see also id. at 100 n.6. Linder points out the long-standing nature of this problem:
Accurate information on industrial injuries in the United States is unfortunately not
available. Not only is it impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy the causes
of accidents, the nature of the injuries, the extent of the disabilities, the number of
workers handicapped through injury, or the cost in time or money lost through indus-
trial injuries, but even the most elementary part of information relating to industrial
injuries-the total number of disabling injuries sustained by industrial workers within a
given year-is not available for the country as a whole.
Id. at 110 (reprinting an excerpt from Industrial Injuries in the United States, 1917 to 1932,
38 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1093, 1094 (1934)). Linder also points out that ["a]ll published esti-
mates of occupational illnesses and diseases have been termed a 'gross underestimate."' Id. at
100 n.6 (quoting Harvey J. Hilaski, Understanding Statistics on Occupational Illnesses, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Mar. 1981, at 25).
36. See Jonathan Jacob Nadler, Employee Participation in Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1317 n.1 (1985).
37. See Linder, supra note 35, at 122-23.
38. See id. at 123.
39. Id.
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pendability."40 Others point out that "the United States has not made
the same commitment to protecting workers that it has made to pro-
tecting the environment."' 41 Whatever progress OSHA did make dur-
ing its first ten years was dissipated during the Reagan administration.
Despite the statute's promise of guaranteed substantive rights to occu-
pational health and safety, OSHA and Republican and Democratic
administrations alike left employers in control of the work process.
Workers remained subordinate and shut out of decisions concerning
their own health and safety. As in labor relations, employer competi-
tiveness, efficiency, and profitability took precedence over occupa-
tional safety and health.
In the 1980s, one of my former colleagues, Dorothy Nelkin,
sought out what was then and remains today a shamefully neglected
vital aspect of workplace health and safety: the perceptions and con-
cerns of workers themselves.42 The major portion of her research con-
sisted of open-ended interviews with people who worked with
chemicals in a wide range of occupations.43 Some "felt frustrated by
company doctors who dismissed their complaints, and with supervi-
sors whose interest in production blinded them to potential
hazards.'44 Others said they didn't talk about safety and health be-
cause: "Who would listen?" 45 Many came to blame themselves
"when employers, unions, and government inspectors failed to deal
with their complaints, or rejected them as based on 'unscientific' evi-
dence.'46 Factory workers believed production was given priority
over health: "If you're working with a piece of equipment, be careful.
You we can replace. That we can't. ' 47
Nelkin found that workers "talked in personal and moral terms"
about the dangers they experienced.48 She concluded:
The issue of occupational health is increasingly volatile, raising
questions of distributive justice in the most fundamental terms. In-
equities are clear. Production and maintenance workers are more
likely to be exposed to chemical risks than white-collar or profes-
40. Joseph A. Kinney, Why Did Paul Die? NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 1990, at 11, noted in Sid-
ney A. Shapiro, Occupational Safety and Health: Policy Options and Political Reality, 31 Hous.
L. REV. 13, 39 (1994).
41. Shapiro, supra note 40, at 39.
42. See DOROTHY NELKIN & MICHAEL S. BROWN, WORKERS AT RISK: VOICES FROM THE
WORKPLACE (1984).
43. See id. at ix.
44. Id. at 179.
45. Id. at 178.
46. Id. at 179.
47. Id. at 180.
48. ld. at 182.
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sional workers, and they tend to have fewer employment choices.
The problem of occupational risks is one more factor in the widen-
ing gap between such groups, encouraging resentment and a fear
among many workers that society considers them a marginal and
expendable class. Many workers felt that management "could care
less if you died."'49
These workers certainly are convinced that the promise of the
OSH Act has been broken. The 1930s hearing room images of law-
yers contrasting with miners and mill workers are still accurate.
Ill. WHY WERE THESE PROMISES BROKEN?
A. The White House
There are several answers to this question, particularly if one con-
centrates on the last twentyrfive years or so. Starting at the White
House, no matter who the occupant, courageous leadership has been
lacking. No president in that period has made and endorsed a clear
statement of the rights of workers to labor in a safe and healthful
workplace and to organize and bargain collectively. Strong presiden-
tial support can be the difference between success and failure in Con-
gress. (Compare, for example, the Clinton administration's
unwillingness in 1994 to provide the same intense political support
that it gave to the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") to a bill that would have made it illegal for an employer
to hire permanent replacements for. economic strikers.)
Much to the detriment of the NLRB and OSHA, the Reagan ad-
ministration implemented an anti-regulatory ideology and was most
responsive to the needs of business. A presidential administration can
make or change agency policy without legislative action through its
power to appoint agency members. Reagan appointed people to the
NLRB and OSHA who were hostile to the laws they were supposed
to carry out. One of his appointments to the NLRB had called for
repeal of those Taft-Hartley provisions "which establish collective
rights as paramount to individual rights."' 50 Reagan's first nominee for
NLRB Chairman was a management consultant who had advised em-
ployers on how to resist unionization.51 His first successful nominee
for the Board chairmanship believed that collective bargaining was
49. Id.
50. JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS
POLICY, 1947-1994, at 248 (1995) (quoting appointee Robert P. Hunter, The Department of La-
bor, in MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP POLICY MANAGEMENT IN A CONSERVATIVE ADMINISTRA-
TION 493 (Charles L. Heatherly ed., 1981)) [hereinafter BROKEN PROMISE].
51. Id. at 249-50 (discussing John Van de Water).
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often "labor monopoly, the destruction of individual freedom, and the
destruction of the marketplace as the mechanism for determining the
value of labor."'5 2 He criticized previous NLRBs whose ignorance of
the "laws of economics" had resulted in decisions rendering U.S. in-
dustry less able to withstand foreign competition.5 3
The Reagan Board's rulings generally elevated management's au-
thority to manage over the NLRA's statutory obligations. For exam-
ple, the rulings ended employers' statutory obligation to bargain
about many major management decisions, substantially deregulated
employer speech in representation election campaigns, and increased
management's authority to discipline employees for engaging in activ-
ity previously protected by the NLRA. 54 The national labor policy
became one of maximizing employers' ability to compete in domestic
and foreign markets by deregulating the management end of labor-
management relations. The Reagan Board subordinated collective
bargaining to the economic interests of employers.
Reagan's first two OSHA chief administrators were extremely
hostile to the OSH Act's mandates. Reagan had promised to get big
government off the backs of business and, true to his promise, his first
OSHA administrator had no experience with occupational health and
safety issues but committed himself to "stemming the flow" of agency
health and safety standards 55 and ["doing] what the President was
elected to do-provide regulatory relief."'56 According to one source,
Reagan's second OSHA administrator told Labor Department offi-
cials that OSHA was "full of communists, and I am going to root them
out."' 57 Later, during House subcommittee hearings, this administra-
tor admitted that he may have used the word "Commies" at the
agency "at one time or another. '58 Senator Kennedy described
52. Id. at 252 (quoting Letter from future NLRB Chairman Donald Dotson, to A.B.A. J.
(Aug. 1980) as it appears in Oversight on the NLRB: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor & the Manpower and
Hous. Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong. 45 (1983)).
53. Id. at 253 (quoting Remarks by NLRB Chairman Donald Dotson Before Maryland
Chapter of Industrial Relations Research Association, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 189, at D-1 to
-2 (Sept. 28, 1983)).
54. See id. at 254-71 (summarizing the Reagan Board's pro-management rulings).
55. See Shapiro, supra note 40, at 26 n.97 (citing McGARrrY & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at
60).
56. McGARTY & SHAPIRo, supra note 10, at 61 (quoting OSHA Assistant Secretary
Thorne Auchter in Joann S. Lublin, New OSHA Chief Tries to Please Business and Labor, But
Rule Cutback Riles Unions, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1981, at 25).
57. Id. at 102. This was Robert Rowland. Id.
58. Id. (citing 14 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 987 (May 16, 1985)).
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OSHA's performance under these two administrators as "a blueprint
of how to effectively repeal a statute without changing the law." 59
President Bush reinforced this anti-regulatory approach by creat-
ing the Competitiveness Council, chaired by Vice President Quayle,
that sought out offensive ("non-competitive") regulations and de-
stroyed them.60 During Reagan's time in the White House, OSHA
became far more acceptable to business. As a U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce official explained it: "I don't think there's a regulatory agency
in Washington that has delivered more on candidate Reagan's
promises on regulatory reform-OSHA's way out in front in that re-
spect."'61 Candidate Reagan's promises to business were kept but not
the OSH Act's promises to working men and women.
B. Congress
Congress has the responsibility to give administrative agencies
the powers and resources they need to overcome obstacles to the
achievement of their statutory objectives. Congress can do that by
exercising its power to legislate, investigate, and appropriate. In the
past twenty-five years, Congress has defaulted on its responsibility to
the NLRB and OSHA in great part because it is politically more prof-
itable for both Democrats and Republicans to run against those
laws-or at least not to be for them.
Congressional opponents of OSHA and the NLRB, in recent
years, have sought to achieve deregulation through appropriation cuts
and riders to appropriation bills rather than the legislative process,
often under the guise of balancing the budget.62 The intent of the
59. See id. (citing Peter Perl, Players: John A. Pendergrass: Hands-on Experience in Work-
place Health, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1986, at A13).
60. See id. at 159-60.
61. Id. at 93 (citing Kenneth B. Noble, OSHA: More Jeers by Critics and Cheers by Business,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1985, at B8).
62. In the summer and fall of 1995, for example, the House threatened to cut the NLRB's
budget by 30%, see Safety and Health: Impact of Budget Resolution on OSHA Faces Test in
House Appropriations Panel, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at A-5 (June 5, 1995), and
OSHA's budget by 20%, see NLRB: GOP Appropriators Slash NLRB's Budget, Restrict Re-
quests For 10(j) Injunctions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BN.A) No. 134, at D-4 (July 13, 1995). The Senate
approved a 50% cut in OSHA's budget. See id.
In a more specific attempt to influence these agencies' application of the law and to limit
workers' statutory rights through the appropriation rather than the legislative process, the House
tacked riders onto appropriations bills. For example, the House Appropriations Committee ad-
ded a rider that required that at least four members of the five-member NLRB approve requests
for 10(j) injunctions instead of the simple majority usually required. See Labor Law: Irving
Blasts Gamesmanship at NLRB as Trigger for Threatened Budget Cutback, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 142, at A-8, -9 (July 25, 1995). The House Appropriations Committee also sought to
impose a more difficult legal standard for obtaining 10(j) relief from a federal judge by a rider
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104th Congress, for example, cannot be squared with the Congres-
sional intentions set forth in the OSH Act or the NLRA. A lack of
funds means ineffective enforcement.
Congress should be committing the NLRB and OSHA to vigor-
ous enforcement of the law. These agencies should be encouraged to
develop and use the full extent of their remedy powers. At the very
least, violators should 'not be able to profit from their violations. The
vigor with which a law is enforced is an excellent test of the federal
government's support of the policies set forth in that law. Thirty years
ago the then-NLRB Chairman Frank McCulloch told Congress that
the Board's remedies were not sufficient to achieve the purposes of
the NLRA. 63 Today those same remedies-reinstatement with back
pay for discriminated-against employees and orders to employers to
bargain in good faith-still do not deter employers from violating the
law. The inadequacy of these remedies coupled with the delays in is-
requiring the NLRB to prove that irreparable harm would occur if the injunction were not
granted. See id. Under section 10(j) of the NLRA, the Board has discretionary authority, after a
complaint has been issued, to request a federal court to issue an injunction prohibiting certain
unfair labor practices. See 29 U.S.C. § 160j) (1994). In most jurisdictions, the NLRB has to
demonstrate only reasonable cause that the Act was violated and persuasive evidence that in-
junctive relief is just and proper. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 142, at A-9.
House Republicans have continued to use this tactic and have vowed to add a rider to the
NLRB's 1998 budget request that would continue a rider to the 1997 and 1996 appropriations
legislation that prevents the agency from using any funds to implement a rule the NLRB pro-
posed in September 1995 creating a presumption favoring single-store units as appropriate for
collective bargaining under certain circumstances. See Appropriations: Goodling Proposes
Freeze on OSHA Funding, Cuts in Other DOL Activities, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at D-
17 (June 4, 1997) (reporting that Rep. William F. Goodling (R-PA) called for subcommittee to
extend the rider); NLRB: Gould Optimistic About '98 Budget Increase Despite Charges of Lib-
eral Policies, Spending, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 55, at D-17 (March 21, 1997) (House Sub-
committee Chairman John Porter (R-Ill) "vowed ... he would try to kill [implementation of the
rule] for the third consecutive year."); Budget. NLRB Seeks Relief From Congressional Rider
Banning Funds For Single Location Unit Rule, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at D-20 (February
7, 1997); NLRB: House Republicans Plan to Extend Rider Barring NLRB Single-Facility
Rulemaking, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 113, at A-8 (June 12, 1996).
Another 1996 rider to OSHA's budget sought to protect employers from an OSHA rule
that would address musculoskeletal disorders and other illnesses associated with repetitive mo-
tion. See id. at A-9. A 1995 rider permitted the agency to continue to conduct ergonomics re-
search but barred it from promulgating any rules or even voluntary employer guidelines in this
area. See id.
For past uses of the appropriations rider to control OSHA, see McGARrrY & SHAPIRO,
supra note 10, at 315. For past uses of NLRB appropriations to control the NLRB, see GROSS,
supra note 19, at 51-52, 55, 202-03, 216, 220-21, 251.
63. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 50, at 240; cf. David L. Gregory, Working for a Liv-
ing, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1355, 1367 (1993) (decrying Board remedies as insufficient) (reviewing
THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT'S FLAT
ON ITS BACK (1991) and BEN HAMPER, RIVETHEAD: TALES FROM THE ASSEMBLY LIE (1991));
Paul Weiler, Promises To Keep: Securing Workers' Right To Self-Organization Under the NLRA,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787-1805 (1983) (describing Board remedies and finding them
ineffective).
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suing remedial orders actually make it "cost efficient" 64 for employers
to violate the Act.
Over the years stronger remedies have been unsuccessfully pro-
posed, such as criminal penalties for willful commission of unfair labor
practices, barring government contracts to repeat violators, double or
triple back pay for unlawfully discharged employees, and requiring
employers guilty of bargaining in bad faith to pay employees the
wages they would have received if those employers had bargained in
good faith.65 Enforcement of this labor law, however, has never been
a top priority in the White House or in Congress. Many courts and
even certain Boards, moreover, have been unwilling to approve more
effective remedies.
OSHA can assess fines and seek criminal penalties.66 Many em-
ployers, in deciding whether to comply with OSH Act, will compare
the costs of compliance with the cost of non-compliance: "Compli-
ance costs include the expense of purchasing safety equipment or tak-
ing other preventive steps that OSHA requires. Noncompliance costs
are related to the probability an employer will be inspected and the
size of the penalties that will be assessed for any violations that are
found.' '67 There is not a substantial probability, however, that even
dangerous workplaces will be inspected. There are only about four
thousand federal and state OSHA compliance officers to inspect and
ensure the safety of approximately 92 million employees in 6 million
workplaces. 68 Although Congress in 1990 did increase the allowable
fines, the fines imposed by OSHA are typically insufficient to induce
employers to obtain new equipment or protective devices even in
cases of death or serious injury.69 Larger fines, moreover, are often
reduced in agency negotiations with employers. 70
The OSH Act also provides that an employer can be sentenced to
six months in jail for the willful violation of an occupational safety and
health standard when that violation causes the death of an em-
ployee.71 (The value judgments underlying that provision should be
64. Gregory, supra note 63, at 1367.
65. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 50, at 176-91, 238.
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(e) (1994).
67. MCGARrrY & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 212; see also David Ziskind, Safety and Health:
An Elusive Quest, 4 COMP. LAB. L.J. 159, 169 (1980).
68. See Brett R. Gordon, Comment, Employee Involvement in the Enforcement of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Laws of Canada and the United States, 15 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 527, 535
(1994).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 536.
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1994). Section 17(e) of the OSH Act reads:
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obvious. Ralph Nader has pointed out, for example, that another fed-
eral law provides for one year in jail for "maliciously harassing [not
killing] a wild ass."' 72) OSHA has ignored the criminal prosecution op-
tion to enforce the law. Congress could increase the effectiveness of
OSHA's enforcement powers by providing for longer sentences for
employers whose willful violations cause employee deaths and ex-
tending criminal penalties to cases involving serious bodily injury.73
But OSHA itself has not vigorously enforced the law by making full
use of its existing enforcement powers.
C. The Courts
Courts, including the Supreme Court, have issued decisions that
disregard the promises of the NLRA and the OSH Act. The worth of
the NLRA, for example, depends in great part on where the line, if
any, is drawn between exclusive management functions on the one
side and the subjects of joint union-management responsibilities on
the other. Decisions that expand employers' unilateral control over
the most important entrepreneurial decisions undercut collective bar-
gaining and, therefore, the purposes and policies of the Act. Yet,
many key Supreme Court decisions reveal a commitment to preserv-
ing the authority and prerogatives of employers and keeping unions
and workers in their subordinate place.
In many ways the Supreme Court took the lead in freeing man-
agement from the constraints of the law on the basis of pure specula-
tion and value-laden dicta about the inviolability of management
rights. As an illustration, in his concurring opinion in Fibreboard Pa-
per Products Corp. v. NLRB, 74 which has become the controlling defi-
nition of labor policy in this matter, Justice Potter Stewart, in still-
quoted language, excluded from an employer's statutory duty to bar-
gain even management decisions that ended employment entirely, if
Any employer who willfully violates any standard, rule, or order promulgated pursuant
to section 655 of this title, or of any regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, and
that violation caused death to any employee, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a
fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by
both; except that if the conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction of
such person, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $20,000 or by imprison-
ment for not more than one year, or by both.
Id.
72. Ralph Nader, Address: Occupational Safety and Health Act, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1, 9
(1994).
73. See, e.g., Anne D. Samuels, Note, Reckless Endangerment of an Employee: A Proposal
in the Wake of Film Recovery Systems to Make the Boss Responsible for His Crimes, 20 UNIV.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 873, 902 (1987).
74. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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those decisions were "at the core of entrepreneurial control . . . [or
were] fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise. ' 75
Here, national labor policy was made according to Stewart's own vis-
ceral test and ideological commitment to a free enterprise economy.76
In 1981, the Supreme Court in First National Maintenance Corp.
v. NLRB,77 a dicta-filled decision riddled with value judgments unsub-
stantiated by legislative history or any other evidence, removed em-
ployers' decisions to close part of their businesses from the list of
mandatory subjects of bargaining. 78 The Court admitted that Con-
gress had not indicated what issues of mutual concern to unions and
management it intended to exclude from mandatory bargaining, if
any,79 and acknowledged that the decision to close an operation was a
matter of vital concern to a union and the employees it represents.80
Nevertheless, the Court was not deterred from asserting, on the basis
apparently of only the majority's notions of what the management-
labor relationship ought to be, that "Congress had no expectation that
the elected union representative would become an equal partner in
the running of the business enterprise. '81 The dominant influence of
the personal value judgments of the majority of justices in this case is
evidenced by their heavy reliance on Justice Stewart's dicta concern-
ing management rights in Fibreboard.82
The message was clear: the more important the entrepreneurial
decision, the more excluded and protected it would be from the reach
of the statutory duty to bargain. Dissenting Justices William Brennan
and Thurgood Marshall criticized the majority in First National Main-
tenance for deciding this important question of industrial relations "on
the basis of pure speculation" 83 and also for using a one-sided ap-
proach that took into account "only the interests of management...
[and failed] to consider the legitimate employment interests of the
workers and their union." 84
75. Id. at 223.
76. Justice Stewart stated: "Congress may eventually decide to give organized labor or gov-
ernment a far heavier hand in controlling what until now have been considered the prerogatives
of private business management. That path would mark a sharp departure from the traditional
principles of a free enterprise economy." Id. at 225-26.
77. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
78. See id. at 686.
79. See id. at 675.
80. See id. at 677.
81. Id. at 676.
82. See, e.g., id. at 677. For a broader discussion of this case, see BROKEN PROMISE, supra
note 50, at 258-62.
83. 452 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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OSHA's record in the courts is mixed.85 On the one hand, as
McGarity and Shapiro have found, "With a few notable exceptions,
the courts have either affirmed OSHA's health standards, affirmed
them in most important respects, or remanded the standards to the
agency to be made stricter. '' 86 The Supreme Court in American Tex-
tile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,87 moreover, rejected the
textile industry's contention that OSHA was required to use cost-ben-
efit tests in the reduction of health hazards. 88 On the other hand, in
addition to finding some judicial resistance to governmental regula-
tion in general, McGarity and Shapiro found that "more and more
judges are convinced that the purpose of judicial review is to protect
the property rights and managerial prerogatives of the companies that
are adversely affected by such review. ' 89 They urge the courts "to
strike an appropriate balance between the protection of property
rights from arbitrary government action and the protection of statu-
tory beneficiaries in the manner Congress intended." 90
D. Organized Labor
Enforcement of the OSH and the Wagner-Taft-Hartley Acts,
moreover, depends on the fate of organized labor in the United
States. Organized labor is in decline. Much of this decline can be
attributed to widespread employer opposition to unionization and to
NLRB decisions permitting and even facilitating that opposition. It is
clearly short sighted, however, to put all the blame on the Reagan
administration because union membership has been on a downward
trend since the mid-1950s. Organized labor, for example, has not
been able to shake the unsavory image created by the McClellan hear-
ings in the late 1950s. Those dramatic televised hearings fixed in the
public mind the still-powerful picture of exploited union members
controlled by corrupt and dictatorial leaders whose only interest was
personal enrichment. 91 In an extraordinary reversal of public percep-
tion, unions, seen by many as liberating forces of social and economic
justice in the 1930s, have come to be commonly regarded as instru-
ments of oppression and exploitation. 92
85. See McGARrrY & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 288.
86. Id. at 289.
87. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
88. See id. at 494, 509.
89. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 261.
90. Id.
91. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 50, at 122-23.
92. See id. at 137-38, 279.
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Organized labor's political influence also declined after the late
1950s as both political parties began moving rightward toward an ide-
ological consensus that espoused a politics of "centrist" conservatism.
Many in the Democratic Party, moreover, no longer considered or-
ganized labor a force for social reform and saw little difference be-
tween "big labor" and "big business." Organized labor's legislative
agenda was consistently given low priority. The AFL-CIO became a
captive of the Democratic Party because it had no reasonable political
alternative. In addition, organized labor has been guilty over the
years of following an unwise legislative strategy that produced several
costly blunders. Among the most damaging was the uncompromising
demand for total repeal of Taft-Hartley after Harry Truman's upset
election victory in 1948. Labor at the time rejected proposed changes
in Taft-Hartley that the AFL-CIO would plead for in its reform bill
thirty years later.93
Unions must also bear some of the blame for restricting the scope
of bargaining, which has fallen far short of the potential envisioned by
Senator Wagner. In general, unions defined for themselves too nar-
row a role in the operation of the enterprise. Most unions' views on
management prerogatives, for example, have been indistinguishable
from those of most corporation chief executive officers. 94 The Ken-
nedy-Johnson NLRB in the 1960s pushed more for power sharing
through collective bargaining than did organized labor. The Kennedy-
Johnson Board argued, for example, that "the scope of collective bar-
gaining is confined by the range of employees' vital interests."95 One
commentator has called labor's renunciation of power sharing the
"longest running mistake in the history of labor. '96 The "social com-
pact" between organized labor and management, in which labor was
junior partner-bargaining only in limited areas while allowing man-
agement unrestricted authority to manage-was the product of lim-
ited vision.
Among the volumes of advice given organized labor about how
to revive itself, the best echoed Senator Wagner.
[T]he brightest hope may lie in a return to appealing to that funda-
mental interest that unions have advanced so effectively in the past:
the dignity of the individual working person and his [or her] full,
93. See id. at 279.
94. See id. at 172-74, 279.
95. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 22-23, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.
v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (No. 14) (emphasis added); see also BROKEN PROMISE, supra note
50, at 174.
96. GEOGHEGAN, supra note 63, at 246.
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genuine participation in the life of [the] workplace and of the
broader community. That, at any rate, would be a reflection with-
out distortion of the principles of social justice [iniforming our na-
tional labor policy.97
Regretfully, with some notable exceptions, occupational safety
and health issues have not been a top priority of organized labor. Too
often many unions traded away health and safety demands for in-
creased wages and fringe benefits. This attitude toward health and
safety, coupled with the decline in unionization, has had serious con-
sequences for the enforcement of the OSH Act. OSHA standards are
much more likely to be enforced if workers at the plant level partici-
pate in the enforcement of the Act. Because of a fear of employer
retaliation and a lack of knowledge of their rights, few employees in
non-unionized workplaces exercise their statutory right to file an indi-
vidual complaint with OSHA.98 Although the Act permits an em-
ployee representative to participate in OSHA walk-around
inspections, 99 this privilege is usually given only to unionized employ-
ees in a plant that has an employee safety representative. 100 Exclusion
from participation in the inspection process, fear of retaliation, and
unawareness of rights too often cause employees to remain silent
about health and safety problems where they work.'0' Effective rep-
resentation and collective bargaining power could resolve those
problems and provide employees the protection and means they need
to assert their statutory rights. 10 2 Fulfilling the promises in the
NLRA, therefore, is also essential to fulfilling the promise of provid-
ing every working man and woman in the nation safe and healthful
working conditions.
E. Employers
I am persuaded, however, that the determined opposition of U.S.
employers taken as a whole has been the biggest obstacle to the ac-
ceptance of the congressionally sanctioned national labor policy of
97. Theodore J. St. Antoine, National Labor Policy: Reflections and Distortions of Social
Justice, 29 CAmH. U. L. Rev. 535, 555 (1980).
98. See Gordon, supra note 68, at 544-45.
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1994).
100. See Gordon, supra note 68, at 545.
101. See id. at 539-40, 546-47.
102. For a somewhat less optimistic view of the prospects for worker participation in the
enforcement of safety regulations in the United States, see Julie E. Korostoff et al., Comment,
Rethinking the OSHA Approach to Workplace Safety: A Look at Worker Participation in the
Enforcement of Safety Regulations in Sweden, France, and Great Britain, 13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 45
(1991).
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collective bargaining and safety and health in U.S. workplaces. 10 3 As
Professor Benjamin Aaron pointed out on the occasion of the fiftieth
anniversary of the NLRB, "employer resistance to unions has deep
historical roots and is still strong and growing."'1 4 This pervasive op-
position is a primary reason that the United States stands almost alone
among democratic nations in leaving the great majority of its statuto-
rily-covered workers without any organization and representation at
the workplace. The proposals that would be most helpful to workers
covered by the NLRA and the OSH Act are the ones the business
community has successfully defeated. Because organized labor, often
the only representative of workers in the political process, is much
weaker now than when the OSH Act passed in 1970, workers have
little chance of passing any reform strongly opposed by business.
IV. CONFLICTING VALUES AND CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTS
AND JUSTICE
Much of the debate about the NLRA and the OSH Act in the
past twenty-five years has focused on specific proposals to amend
these laws and the strategies, objectives, and relative political power
of those who would gain or lose as a consequence of such legislative
changes. Rather than revisit those now familiar debates, this paper
will concentrate on one of U.S. business's most important achieve-
ments in the past twenty-five years-persuading the public to take se-
riously what previously had been treated cynically or humorously: the
contention that what is good for General Motors is good for the coun-
try. The current NLRA and OSH Act national labor policies have
become ineffective in great part because sharply conflicting values and
conceptions of rights and justice have influenced the content and ap-
plication of these laws. The current state of the NLRA and OSH Act
cannot be fully understood without identifying these underlying
values.
An- honest reexamination of the OSH Act and the NLRA, more-
over, cannot ignore this fundamental disagreement about whose rights
and what values are to be given priority. Resolution of that disagree-
-103. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 50, at 200-16, 234-36, 239-41, 277-78 (describing em-
ployer resistance to the NLRA); NOBLE, supra note 12, at 14, 99-120 (same in the OSH Act
context); see also MARK GREEN & ANDREW BUCHSBAUM, THE CORPORATE LOBBIES: POLIT-
ICAL PROFILES OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE & THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1980); SAR A.
LEVITAN & MARTHA R. COOPER, BUSINESS LOBBIES: THE PUBLIC GOOD & THE BO-rTOM LINE
(1984); MICHAEL USEEM, THE INNER CIRCLE (1984).
104. Benjamin Aaron, The NLRB, Labor Courts, and Industrial Tribunals: A Selective Com-
parison, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 35, 35 (1985).
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ment will determine not only the future of these two laws but also
what kind of people we want to be and what kind of society we want
to have. What is at issue here involves more than changing agency
doctrines and procedures or debates about amendments to these laws
to tighten or loosen regulation. As Wagner and Wirtz recognized, in-
dustrial democracy and workplace safety and health are moral and
ethical issues more than they are legal, economic, or political.'0 5 But
so too are the contrary values espoused by U.S. employers. It is not
possible to separate moral and ethical questions from economic, legal,
or political ones in fashioning a labor policy.
.A. The Values of Business and Free Market Economics
The rehabilitation of the values of market capitalism began in the
mid-1960s with a secret and coordinated effort undertaken by the
country's major employers, including many who were already union-
ized and considered models of corporate propriety.10 6 They mobilized
to combat Kennedy-Johnson NLRB decisions that threatened their
decisionmaking prerogatives. Their hidden campaign included the
manipulation of both the media and public opinion and used means
threatening to a democratic society. For them, industrial democracy
and free enterprise were fundamentally incompatible.
By the early 1970s, business and industry realized that the steady
increase in the cost of doing business was due only partially to unioni-
zation and collective bargaining.'0 7 More significant was the increase
in government intervention and regulation in all areas of business,
proliferating even under a Republican administration. Regulations in-
volving occupational health and safety, environmental pollution, con-
sumer protection, energy use, and employment discrimination, they
believed, were hamstringing the free enterprise system and went far
beyond any restrictions placed on foreign competitors. They blamed
government regulation and intervention for slow economic growth, di-
minished productivity increases, unemployment, inadequate savings
and investment, and international trade problems.
The situation was aggravated, business leaders were convinced,
by a lack of public support and understanding for business. They be-
lieved that the public had exaggerated impressions of their profit mar-
gins and ability to control prices and of the division of income
105. See supra notes 1-5, 13 and accompanying text.
106. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 50, at 200-16, 277-78; see also NOBLE, supra note 12,
at 104-20 (discussing employer opposition to safety and health standards).
107. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 50, at 234-36 (describing the Business Roundtable).
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between employees and stockholders. This notion, they maintained,
had led to these "unwise" regulations. It was a new crisis for capital-
ism. In 1972, the Labor Law Reform Group, formed in the late 1960s
merged with other business groups to form the Business Roundtable
("BRT"). a08 The Business Roundtable became a fraternity of the na-
tion's most powerful and prestigious business leaders. The BRT's
CEOs represented approximately two hundred of the largest corpora-
tions in the country from each sector of the economy, including the
top ten of the 1978 Fortune 500. The Roundtable was the voice of
business in Washington. It had great political power, wealth, organi-
zation, and influence with the mass media, with its strength centered
in and exercised by the CEOs who were personally and actively in-
volved in the organization's lobbying efforts. As columnist Victor
Riesel put it, "there has been nothing like this inside the worlds of
commerce and industry." 10 9
They knew the issues facing business were going to be decided in
great part by public opinion. These business leaders wanted to de-
velop a "mature understanding of how the business system operates"
rather than simply react after business was "hit" by its critics. 110 They
wanted employers to advocate positive solutions and not simply be
against every proposed change. In short, "they had to teach Ameri-
cans the virtues of profit making and free enterprise""' without mak-
ing it appear that business was seeking special favors." 2 They
succeeded.
It has become a virtual article of faith that survival (and jobs) in
this new era of economic competition depends on strategies that are
favorable to business and hostile to organized labor: unencumbered
and creative management responses to change; the end of costly con-
tracts with unions; the retention or regaining of management preroga-
tives, power, and flexibility; the freedom to overcome other labor cost
advantages enjoyed by competitors here and around the world; and
the end of governmental regulations. Business leaders maintain that
108. See id.
109. Id. at 235 (citing Victor Riesel, The Business Roundtable, SYRACUSE POST STANDARD,
Nov. 16, 1972).
110. Memorandum from Paul M. Lund, chairman, Public Information Committee, to Mem-
bers of the Policy, Construction, Labor-Management, and Public Information committees of the
Business Roundtable (June 4, 1973) (on file with the Labor-Management Documentation
Center, Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations) ("BR Post-Murphy," Box
6, Soutar Papers); GRoss supra note 24, at 235.
111. NOBLE, supra note 12, at 101.
112. For a discussion of this "climate creation" and the manipulation of public opinion, see
BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 50, at 201, 205-16.
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this is necessary for the country to prosper, the wheels of the free
enterprise system to turn, and workers' pay envelopes to be filled.
What is good for business, the argument goes, is good for the public.
In other words, business succeeded not only in dominating the
prevailing political and intellectual climate but also in redefining occu-
pational health and safety and labor-management issues in ways that
made breaking the promises of the NLRA and the OSH Act seem
necessary for the good of society. Many academics, particularly econ-
omists of the free market persuasion, helped business make its case.
This current episode of laissez-faire economics has its origins in Adam
Smith's basic philosophy and assumptions: 113 that self-interest is what
motivates people to act; that competition, not the state, is the regula-
tor of self-interest; and that, consequently, it was necessary that gov-
ernment leave the market alone and not meddle with it because "the
invisible hand" as Smith called the "laws of the market" would lead
the self-interests of men in the direction of the best interests of the
whole society." 4
The rising industrialists of Smith's time found in his theory "the
theoretical justification they needed to block the first government at-
tempts to remedy the scandalous conditions of the times."" 5 As Rob-
ert Heilbroner has written:
But because any act of the government-even such laws as those
requiring the whitewashing of factories or preventing the shackling
of children to machines-could be interpreted as hampering the
free operation of the market, [Smith's] The Wealth of Nations was
liberally quoted to oppose the first humanitarian legislation. 116
Although Smith was more avowedly hostile to the motives of business-
men than most New Deal economists-he warned that eighteenth-
century industrialists generally deceived and oppressed the public-he
came to be regarded as their "patron saint" and a "conservative
economist."117
Although the models designed by what are now called neoclassi-
cal economists have become more abstract, more elaborate, and more
mathematical, Smith's basic principles remain at their core. Although
the mathematical methods and language and the deductive reasoning
113. ADAM SMrrT, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS (Edwin Carman ed., University of Chicago Press, 1952) (1776). Probably few, if any (in-
cluding economists), have read Smith's classic work from beginning to end.
114. See generally, ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 42-74 (6th ed.
1986) (describing Smith's views).
115. Id. at 69.
116. Id. at 70.
117. Id. at 70-71.
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"tend to give economists a certitude that theirs-and theirs alone-is
a 'hard' social science,""l l8 economics is an ideologically charged and
value-laden under-taking: Marxian economics assumes the inevitabil-
ity of class conflict; Keynesianism posits the instability. of industrial
capitalism and advocates government intervention; and neoclassical
economics "is a lavishly embroidered brief for laissez-faire." 119
How could it be otherwise? Economists study who gets what and
why, that is, how individuals and society choose to use scarce re-
sources to produce various commodities over time and to distribute
them for consumption among various people and groups in the soci-
ety. Every economic system has historical roots and embodies value
judgments about the individual person, law, private property, liberty,
and the role of government. A particular system and theory are cho-
sen because they yield policy implications compatible with some one's
or some group's vision of what should be in the world.' 20
Today's economics is just as rooted in ideology. At a time when
all public policy questions are being defined as economic ones, econo-
mists are the experts being called upon to give practical advice about
the formulation and implementation of labor and occupational safety
and health policy. Their underlying value premises, however, are at
least as important as the extent of their empirical knowledge of the
real world or the validity of their mathematical analyses.
The each-versus-all individualism that drives the "free market"
approach to life, for example, induces people to be preoccupied with
their own private self-interests and, ultimately, to accept even the
harsh economic and social consequences of the market as the inevita-
ble results of impersonal forces beyond their control or comprehen-
sion. The claim that the market system is impersonal makes it more
plausible to argue that the market can be neither just nor unjust. This
is because the market's apportionment of benefits and burdens is sup-
posedly the result, not of some person's or group's deliberate alloca-
tion of income and wealth to particular people, but of the interaction
of a multitude of circumstances not known in their totality to anyone
or controlled by anyone. The consequences for people in the system,
therefore, are neither intended nor foreseen. It is absurd, the argu-
ment goes, to demand justice of such a process because there is no
118. Robert Kuttner, The Poverty of Economics, ALArcIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1985, at 74, 79.
119. Id. at 83.
120. See ALEXANDER GRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC DOCTRINE: AN INTRODUC-
TORY SURVEY 66 (1931); CHARIEs K. WILBER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF ECONOMICS
150-51 (1983).
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answer to the question of who has been unjust. There is no individual
or group of people against whom a sufferer (or loser) would have a
just complaint. In fact, justice and injustice are not only allegedly ir-
relevant but in the words of a foremost advocate of free market the-
ory, "'social justice' is simply a quasi-religious superstition."'121 Here
is the complete separation of ethics from economics.
Exponents of this "free market" approach also claim that it maxi-
mizes individual liberty. Given the nature of the free market, the bad
things that happen to individuals in their working lives are merely mis-
fortunes beyond anyone's control. The unfortunate, however, are per-
fectly free to go where things are better-and they will, we are
assured, because we are all rational satisfaction maximizers. If an in-
dividual does not respond to market "incentives," then that individual
and no one or nothing else is to blame. In other words, the fault can-
not lie with the functioning of the economic system itself or the power
structure of the society, or the unfairness of the distributions of the
society's benefits and burdens. Finally, government regulation only
restrains the freedom of individual employers and employees and pre-
vents the market from producing and allocating most efficiently and
from achieving the greatest public good.122
When applied now to the real world, this economic philosophy
has a bias against protective legislation because it elevates economic
efficiency to "a 'meta-value' that trumps all other conflicting val-
ues."'1 23 For example, cost-benefit analysis is proposed as the way to
determine how much of society's scarce resources go to occupational
health and safety. In addition, OSHA should be abolished, it is main-
tained, because economic incentives in the market such as workers'
compensation and hazard pay provide almost all the protection work-
ers need. There is a consensus, however, that cost-benefit analysis al-
ways overstates the cost and undervalues the benefits of occupational
safety and health improvements. 124 Consequently, cost-benefit analy-
sis favors the status quo. In addition, underneath the "precise-looking
calculations lies a mine field of speculation, untested assumptions, and
121. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 66 (1976) (volume 2 of LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY).
122. See generally id. at 62-100 (setting forth Hayek's opinion in a section called "Social" or
Distributive Justice); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
123. Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 630-31 (1996) (quoting THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RA-
TIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 153
(1991)).
124. See id. at 626-27.
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hidden value judgments.' 25 Economists' attempts to put a dollar
value on human life and the consequences of workplace deaths, inju-
ries, and disease for families and society ensure that the final out-
comes of such analyses are ideologically and not scientifically
determined.
In the early 1920s, the founder of the University of Chicago free
market School of Economics remarked "that the distinction between
laborers and the owners of companies is that laborers have freely
elected to risk their health and safety, whereas owners have chosen
instead to risk their capital.' 26 Modern day free market economists
still maintain, as did Adam Smith, that workers freely accept employ-
ment that poses a higher risk to their health and safety. They do this
in great part, Smith said, because they will receive higher wages to
compensate them for the unusually hazardous conditions of work to
which they will be exposed. 127 Economic theory says that workers will
bargain for these wage premiums, or hazard pay, as extra compensa-
tion for exposing themselves to workplace hazards and that employers
will pay those wage premiums to attract those workers to hazardous
jobs until the cost of removing or substantially reducing the hazards is
less than the cost of the premium pay. When workers' compensation
cost increased without injury reduction, economists blamed it on em-
ployee behavior. They concluded that when workers' compensation
benefits increased workers were less vigilant and, therefore, suffered
more (and more serious) injuries because the higher benefits reduced
the economic cost such injuries caused them.128
These hazard pay and workers' compensation theories betray ar-
rogance as well as ignorance about the behavior of workers. Aside
from the inadequacy of workers' compensation benefits, this is a "bi-
zarre view of human nature under which the prospect of money in the
future will persuade people to risk severe pain, hospitalization, dis-
125. McGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 267.
126. Id. at 17 (attributing comments to Professor Frank Knight).
127. See Linder, supra note 35, at 134 (quoting Smith: "The wages of labour vary with the
ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness of the
employment." SMITH, supra note 113, at 42.).
128. For presentations of this approach, see W. Kip Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING
HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE (1983); W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992); JOHN MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY: AN
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY (1979);
ROBERT STEWART SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACr: ITS GOALS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS (1976).
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memberment, and even death in the present. ' 129 As already dis-
cussed, moreover, the overwhelming number of workers in this
country have no bargaining power to negotiate wage premiums-par-
ticularly when they can be fired at will. In addition, workers in many
hazardous jobs can be replaced easily. Often these workers have no
alternative jobs readily available. In reality, the pool of labor for
many hazardous jobs consists of poorly educated and low-skilled
workers who accept the risks for low pay. Workers also do not have
adequate information about job hazards, particularly concerning what
they are being exposed to, particularly given the uncertainty about the
causes of many diseases. Contrary to economic theory:
[M]anagement has sought to organize the process of production in
many hazardous industries so as to reduce the need for highly
skilled workers. To the extent possible management replaces these
workers with a combination of less skilled employees and increased
supervision and control. Over time, managerial responses produce
a pattern in which hazardous jobs require less education achieve-
ment, provide less on-the-job training, and offer fewer opportunities
for worker autonomy, responsibility and creativity in the work pro-
cess. These unskilled hazardous jobs pay lower wages than skilled
safe jobs.130
Participants in Professor Nelkin's survey of chemical industry
workers asked why they should be burdened "with the impossible
choice between health and work.' 131 In the words of one worker:
Every worker has a choice. Any worker can quit his job. I
mean when you come down to brass tacks, anyone can quit. But the
realities of life-family, the children, mortgage payment-impose
certain limitations on the worker's right to just quit. I don't feel
personally that people should have to quit to protect their health. I
feel that the employer by obligation, by law, must provide a safe
and healthy workplace. And if the employers live up to their obli-
gations, then there would be no reason for a worker to make the
choice. 132
Another worker put it this way:
You never balance the wage against the risk; you balance the wage
against the alternative. And the alternative is starving when you're
put in this situation. That's what's so phony about this cost/benefit
analysis. A worker in the plant doesn't say, "Well, I'm getting $6.50
129. McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 123, at 604 (citing Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?:
Workers' Compensation and the Persistence of Occupational Injuries, 31 Hous. LAW REV. 119,
212 n.375 (1994)).
130. JAMES C. ROBINSON, TOIL AND ToxIcs: WORKPLACE STRUGGLES AND POLITICAL
STRATEGIES FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 75-76 (1991); see also McGARITY & SHAPIRO supra
note 10, at 272 (quoting ROBINSON).
131. NELKIN & BROWN, supra note 42, at 182.
132. Id. at 92.
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an hour so I'm gonna take the risk." The worker in the plant says,
"I'm getting $6.50 an hour. If I open my mouth I might get nothing
an hour, or I might get minimum wage .... There's no difference
for a person in that position. Either way they're trapped. 133
John Stuart Mill over one hundred years earlier drew the same
conclusion about his real world. In his Principles of Political Econ-
omy, Mill wrote that, contrary to Smith's notions, ["t]he really ex-
hausting and the really repulsive labours, instead of being better paid
than others, are almost invariably paid the worst of all, because per-
formed by those who have no choice."'1 34 In the late 1800s a British
court echoed Mill: "If the plaintiff could have gone away from the
dangerous place without incurring the risk of losing his means of live-
lihood, the case might have been different; but he was obliged to be
there; his poverty, not his will, consented to incur the damage."'1 35 It
would be an interesting study in values to try to determine why to-
day's free market economists follow Smith and not Mill-at least con-
cerning the hazard pay theory.
It also needs to be pointed out that free market economic theory
assumes that employers have the right to expose workers to toxic sub-
stances and other hazardous conditions of work. The hazard pay the-
ory, in addition, affirms as proper a distribution of power, permitting
CEOs and skilled and educated employees to buy more safety than
less educated and less skilled workers. McGarity and Shapiro ob-
served sarcastically: "In a country that holds equality of opportunity
as a primary value, perhaps the better measure for the value of a
worker's life is how much it would take to induce the chairman of the
board to leave his [or her] current job and undertake hazardous em-
ployment for a year."'1 36
Many economists, however, maintain that issues of distributive
justice are beyond their jurisdiction. As one put it:
Those who die because society rejects inefficient lifesaving pro-
grams will not be around to benefit from the bigger pie. Does this
fact require condemnation of any policy that stops short of maxi-
mum effort to prevent deaths? No. It is inevitable that public pol-
icy will create losers who are beyond the reach of compensation.
133. Id. at 91.
134. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 388 (Augustus M. Kelley,
Publishers 1987) (1848); see also Linder, supra note 35, at 135 (discussing Mill). According to
Mill, "The more revolting the occupation, the more certain it is to receive the minimum of remu-
neration, because it devolves on the most helpless and degraded .... MILL, supra.
135. Linder, supra note 35, at 135-36 (quoting Thrussel v. Handyside, 20 Q.B. 359, 364
(1888)).
136. McGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 275.
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But this fact should spur thinking about who the losers are and how
we feel about their plight.137
The widows and orphans of those workers whose deaths could have
been prevented will surely be consoled to know that scholars will be
thinking about their plight.
B. The Values of the NLRA and the OSH Act
The promises made in the NLRA and the OSH Act embody fun-
damentally different values and conceptions of rights and justice.
They promised to guarantee the rights essential for individuals if they
are to be respected as human beings and to have what they need to
lead good human lives. These rights protect the "special moral status
of persons and secure for them at least the minimum of respect re-
quired for citizenship in a decent and just society."'1 38 The NLRA and
the OSH Act confirmed that a fully human life requires, among other
things, rights to meaningful work; to safe and healthful conditions of
work; to pay sufficient to ensure a life of human dignity for a worker
and his or her family; to form and join labor organizations; and to
participate in the workplace decisions affecting their lives.
Despite a universally professed dedication to justice, history pro-
vides proof enough that human life is cheap and readily sacrificed,
diminished, or wasted in support of some economic, political, military,
or even religious interest. Yet, in a just society there can be no throw-
away people. In a democracy, in particular, all individuals must mat-
ter if they are to be allowed to live the fully human lives the demo-
cratic system is supposed to cherish.
Certainly, the right to physical security is indispensable to the en-
joyment of all other rights. The right to physical security-the right
not to be subjected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape, or assault-is
commonly acknowledged. Enormous amounts of money, time, and
human effort are spent in this country on police forces, jails, guards,
criminal courts, schools for training lawyers and police, and the rest of
the vast system for the prevention, detection, and punishment of vio-
lations of physical security. Although one is no less dead or maimed
137. JOHN MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCES REGULATION: How OVER-
REGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 33 (1988); see also Sidney A. Shapiro &
Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991
DUKE L.J. 729, 740 (criticizirg Mendeloff).
138. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO JURISPRUDENCE 91 (1984).
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or assaulted by an on-the-job injury or an occupational disease than
from a gun shot, the society certainly treats the causes differently.
Even if physical security and subsistence rights were respected
and protected, however, more is required for a life to be truly human
than health and safety and enough food and drink, clothing and shel-
ter to survive. A full human life begins by not having to depend on
others' benevolence, charity, love, pity, or devotion to duty. It begins
when people understand that they inherently deserve just treatment
and stop considering themselves lucky and indebted when they re-
ceive even minimally decent treatment.
A full human life, therefore, requires participation in the polit-
ical, economic, and social life of the human community-not the
pseudo-participation of form with no power, but genuine effective
participation where people have an influence on the decisions that af-
fect their lives. Participation is a basic right because it is necessary for
the exercise of other rights. No one can enjoy the substance of a right
when dependent on the arbitrary will of others-no matter how be-
nevolent the others may be. As Henry Shue has written, "to enjoy
something only at the discretion of someone else, especially someone
powerful enough to deprive you of it at will, is precisely not to enjoy a
right to it. '' 139 If the lord giveth, then the lord can taketh away and
victims will have no defense without established forms of participation
available to them.
Although too many in this country passively decline participation
in politics and voluntarily (and irresponsibly) hand over to others con-
trol of their communities, the right of free people to choose their lead-
ers is considered the basic and sacred form of active participation in
political life. Even those not exercising this right would protest vigor-
ously, possibly violently, if that right were denied. Yet the over-
whelming number of working people, even when prospering, are
subject to the arbitrary will of others or to the allegedly impersonal
forces of economic markets. Although the impact of employer deci-
sions on human life is much more direct than the impact of most polit-
ical decisions, the preoccupation is with issues of state power and
political democracy, while most people are subjugated to economic
forces and power over which they are allowed to have little or no con-
trol. Yet, while assertions of individual rights and freedom are com-
monly made against the exercise of power by the state, rights and
139. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 78
(1980).
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freedom are routinely left outside the factory gates and office build-
ings with barely a murmur of protest. Consequently, too many work-
ers stand before their employers not as adult persons with rights but
as powerless children or servants totally dependent on the will and
interests of their superiors and employers.
It is a tragedy as well as an injustice that human beings are
treated as things or resources for others to use. It is an even greater
tragedy and injustice that so many millions suffer poverty and help-
lessness patiently and dumbly because they have come to expect so
little out of life. Chekhov once asked his fellow Russians, "you live
badly, my friends. Is it really necessary for you to live so badly?"'1
In response to Chekhov, rights, such as those promised in the NLRA
and OSH Acts, can take the victim's side by restraining the powerful
and reducing people's vulnerability to harm at the hands of others-
particularly agents of governments and private employers. Rights are
shields against coercion. They "are asserted against power abused. ' 141
The sole or even primary purpose of a national labor policy
should not be to increase worker productivity and employer competi-
tiveness, although these effects may be byproducts. The primary pur-
pose of a national labor policy should be to find a moral basis for
achieving human dignity, solidarity, and justice for all parties at the
workplace and in the larger communities affected by what goes on at
the workplace. There are costs, even inefficiencies, in having an ethi-
cal society. The compelling argument for a national labor policy, how-
ever, is not that it increases employer competitiveness but that it
embodies moral values. Senator Wagner's primary concern, to which
he always subordinated the Wagner Act's other important legislative
goals of economic recovery and industrial peace, remained the
achievement of social justice through collective bargaining at the
workplace. 142
What has happened to the NLRA is contrary to the promise this
nation made to itself that it would be a democracy, and to the funda-
mental democratic purpose of the Wagner Act, which Senator Taft
claimed remained the central objective of his new law. Its dedication
to the idea that principles of democracy should apply at the workplace
was the underlying strength of U.S. national labor policy and still is.
140. Quoted in Alfred Kazin, The Way We Live Now, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Apr. 22, 1993, at
3, 4 (reviewing ROBERT HUGHES, CULTURE OF COMPLAINT: THE FRAYING OF AMERICA (1993)).
141. Judith N. Shklar, Injustice, Injury, and Inequality, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY HERE AND
Now 25 (Frank S. Lucash ed., 1986).
142. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 50, at 282-83.
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In a democracy, private power is a public trust. The very purpose of
the United States, although too rarely realized, was to enable the pow-
erless to restrain the powerful. Neither private nor government power
would be permitted to control human lives, because both would be
subject to the public will. Democracy is working only when it meets
this test-and the right of people to participate in the decisions that
affect their lives is one of the most fundamental principles of democ-
racy. The right of workers to participate in decisions affecting their
workplace lives, on which the Wagner Act was based, is the policy
most consistent with democratic principles. Independent labor organ-
ization and collective bargaining, therefore, are essential to democ-
racy, not merely the consequences of management mistakes. 43
Collective bargaining, though far from perfect, has given many
employees an opportunity to participate in the determination of their
wages, hours, and working conditions and other aspects of their lives
on the job. Possibly the greatest single contribution of unions and col-
lective bargaining is the grievance and arbitration process. These sys-
tems of industrial justice substituted more humane rules for arbitrary
treatment and unilateral dictation and developed formal procedures
to resolve claims of unfair treatment during the term of a collective
bargaining agreement, by either voluntary settlement or recourse to
an impartial third party. Unions also provide many working people
with otherwise unavailable access to political forums. When the na-
tional labor policy is used to discourage unionization and collective
bargaining, the protection of and opportunities for legitimate partici-
pation that unions brought to even a minority of workplaces are
lost. 144
That, coupled with the decline of unionism, leaves unprotected
the great majority of employees who do not have sufficient individual
economic and political power to protect themselves. Almost sixty
years after the Wagner Act, the overwhelming majority of employees
are unorganized, unrepresented, and unprotected by grievance and ar-
bitration systems in situations where they may be fired at will for al-
most any reason. A truly democratic government would not be
indifferent to the lack of democracy at the workplace. 145
Workers have a statutory right under the OSH Act, as well as a
human right, to insist that employers do the best they can with the
143. See id. at 280-81.
144. See id. at 283.
145. See id.
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available risk reduction technologies to protect human health. Under
this approach to the regulation of occupational health and safety, em-
ployers can be required to install risk reduction technologies even
though the cost of such technologies might exceed the benefits accord-
ing to economic analysis. This "technology-based" approach incorpo-
rates the moral and ethical superiority of preventing workplace death,
injury, and illness over the market economists' approach of compen-
sating victims and their families after damage has been done. 146
This approach is also the embodiment of the moral principle that,
contrary to the self-interest motivation central to economists, the
maximization of material wealth is not the sole or even the primary
goal of a good and just society. Occupational disease and injury are
more than inefficient, they kill people. So, it demeans human life to
treat the decisions to provide occupational safety and health no differ-
ently than the satisfaction maximization process supposedly engaged
in by individual consumers buying goods and services. A decent soci-
ety will be guided by non-economic moral principles when protecting
human beings from avoidable occupational injuries and illnesses.
Worker participation is also necessary to ensure that the' OSH
Act's promises are kept. Of course, employees need an organizational
structure in order to have effective participation that asserts and
secures their rights under the OSH Act. In the absence of labor orga-
nizations that could provide that structure, mandated labor-manage-
ment safety committees with the power to make decisions concerning
workplace safety and health would help workers become part of the
decisionmaking process. 147
In addition, exercise of the legal right to refuse hazardous work
without retaliation is essential if employees are going to take control
over their own lives in regard to workplace healih and safety. The
right to refuse unsafe work is also an important moral right because
without it workers' lives matter less than management authority, effi-
ciency, productivity, or profit margins. The refusal to perform hazard-
ous work is, moreover, a necessary part of the morally superior
preventive approach to occupational health and safety. If the workers
the OSH Act was supposed to protect could protect themselves, en-
forcement of the Act's promises would not depend solely on the polit-
ical interests of elected officials or the changing fortunes of one
political party or another. However, independent collective action by
146. See, e.g., McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 123, at 630; Ziskind, supra note 67, at 163.
147. See Gordon, supra note 68, at 541-59.
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workers, which could make it more likely that the promises of the
NLRA and the OSH Act will be kept, has been effectively discour-
aged. Under current U.S. law, employees may refuse work only when
they have "a reasonable belief that performance of the work poses an
imminent danger of death or serious ... injury."'1 48 This is a most
narrowly defined and limited right-"so strict a standard that it is
rarely met by the employee."'1 49 The dominant values here, of course,
are the maintenance of employer control and authority at the work-
place and a fear and distrust of workers' motives. 50
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The NLRA and the OSH Act subordinated markets and em-
ployer power to the attainment of respect-based human rights. Both
laws had the fundamental moral objective of helping the powerless
restrain the powerful. Both sought to eliminate the vulnerability that
leaves workers at the mercy of other people or supposedly impersonal
economic forces-either of which can transform them from self-reli-
ant participants in society into helpless victims. Both laws, the NLRA
more than the OSH Act, gave people the opportunity to be engaged
actively in securing their own rights and interests through participa-
tion in workplace decisionmaking. The NLRA was designed to ac-
complish its objectives by encouraging workers to organize and
participate through collective bargaining in the workplace decisions
that affect their lives. The OSH Act sought to accomplish its objective
of safe and healthful working conditions for all working people by
requiring employers to provide jobs and workplaces free from recog-
nized hazards that were likely to cause death or serious physical harm
to employees.
But those promises have been broken not by some uncontrollable
impersonal forces but by deliberate political and economic policy
choices. Despite fatalistic commentaries about the futility of trying to
reverse these choices, the history of politics shows that no one group
or ideology dominate forever and that even after long periods of polit-
ical stability abrupt changes in political outcomes occur when other
148. Id. at 539.
149. Id.
150. For a discussion of the dominance of the management rights value over worker health
and safety in the decisions of labor arbitrators, see James A. Gross & Patricia A. Greenfield,
Arbitral Value Judgments in Health and Safety Disputes: Management Rights Over Workers'
Rights, 34 BuFF. L. REv. 645-91 (1985).
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interests gain significant political power.' 5' There are many reasons
for that, but one is the ability of challengers to redefine a policy is-
sue-as business succeeded in doing not only concerning the NLRA
and the OSH Act but also the whole regulatory system.
This paper tries to redefine those public policy issues in a number
of ways. It recalls the values and conceptions of rights and justice on
which the promises of the NLRA and the OSH Act were based. It
also shows that the respect-based human rights and principles of social
justice underlying those statutes were subordinated to the values of
free market economics and the rights of property, as well as manage-
ment rights.
This paper also attempts to reaffirm the moral superiority and
democratic nature of the values embodied in the NLRA and the OSH
Act. The provisions of those laws confirmed that workers were
human beings-not mere resources-and that human beings were not
to be submissive to employers, markets, or governments. Americans
need to be reminded that these statutory provisions promoted individ-
ual rights and responsibility, social obligations, and a democratic ap-
proach to employment decisions and the allocation of scarce
resources. These are democratic American values. Employment at
will, on the contrary, is an American practice that violates those dem-
ocratic values in a most fundamental way. It is a classic example of
autocracy at the workplace.
Certainly, those who benefit from the economic and political sta-
tus quo will resist any efforts to redefine the NLRA and OSH Act
issues. They appeal most often to the public's distrust of government
and opposition to its expansion. To those whose power would be lim-
ited by regulation,
injustice is not inflicted by the powerful on the weak-bosses com-
pelling workers to endure unsafe conditions, employers engaging in
racial discrimination, industry polluting our environment, producers
endangering consumers. Rather, injustice is inflicted on the power-
ful by the weak when their governmental surrogates (regulators)
seek to compel the powerful to obey the law.'52
151. See Shapiro, supra note 40, at 33-42; see also FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D.
JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); JOHN W. KINGDON, CON-
GRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (1989).
152. Richard L. Abel, Risk as an Area of Struggle, 83 MICH. L. REV. 772, 784 (1985) (review-
ing EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGU-
LATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); W.G. CARSON, THE OTHER PRICE OF BRITAIN'S OIL:
SAFETY AND CONTROL IN THE NORTH SEA (1982); and NELKIN & BROWN, supra note 42).
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But from the beginning, economic development has been dependent
on government policies and government has served capital well. What
the opponents of interference in the economy by "big government"
mean to condemn, therefore, "is government interference on behalf of
ordinary people, not government interference on behalf of busi-
ness."'1 53 It takes a lot of government to sustain laissez faire.
For years, many who have the power to be heard have called for
minimum and inactive government. But inactive government is abu-
sive and unjust when the weak and vulnerable are left to their fate.
Freeing property from state control does not free ordinary people
from the tyranny of property 154 or the tyranny of being left alone
when in need of help. Why object to the power of the state to coerce
individuals, but not to employers' explicit powers over individuals'
lives or to the implicit coercive power of the "free market"? 155 Inac-
tive government also tolerates, if not encourages, gross inequalities of
social status and wealth so that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness become matters not of justice and rights but of economic
fortune. 156
Regulation both extends and restricts freedom; only the balance
of the freedoms won and lost is significant. Karl Polyani observed this
about the reaction of what he called the "comfortable classes" 157 to
regulation:
They are naturally less anxious to extend freedom in society than
those who for lack of income must rest content with a minimum of
it. This becomes apparent as soon as compulsion is suggested in
order to more justly spread out income, leisure and security.
Though restriction applies to all, the privileged tend to resent it, as
if it were directed solely against themselves. They talk of slavery,
while in effect only an extension to the others of the vested freedom
they themselves enjoy is intended. Initially, there may have to be
reduction in their own leisure and security, and, consequently, their
freedom so that the level of freedom throughout the land shall be
raised. But such a shifting, reshaping and enlarging of freedoms
153. FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR 44 (1985).
154. See id. at 75.
155. See WILBER, supra note 120, at 236-37. Wilber writes:
The implicit coercion of the market mechanism forces labor to move from rural to ur-
ban areas, limits the ability to choose by income level, and imposes discipline through
the threat of unemployment. In a market system the degree of freedom varies with
income, especially in the case of consumer sovereignty. As a result, the market restricts
freedom just as surely as does the state.
Id. at 237; see also Karl Nutting, Work and Freedom in Capitalism, in MORAL RioHTs IN THE
WORKPLACE 103 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed. 1987).
156. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 50, at 285-86.
157. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 254 (1957).
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should offer no ground whatsoever for the assertion that the new
condition must necessarily be less free than was the old.158
In other words, "regulation and control can achieve freedom not only
for the few, but for all."1 59 Consequently, to turn against regulation is
to turn against reform so that the idea of freedom
degenerates into a mere advocacy of free enterprise . . . . This
means the fullness of freedom for those whose income, leisure and
security need no enhancing, and a mere pittance of liberty for the
people ... [ trying] to make use of their democratic rights to gain
shelter from the power of the owners of property.
160
Government encouragement and protection are absolutely essen-
tial to the exercise of democratic rights at the workplace. The real
task is to get the government back on the side of the powerless at
workplaces all around the United States. The objective is to create
more abundant freedom for all. An economic system, no less than a
political system, is supposed to exist for the people.
Finally, a word about ourselves. Unfortunately, when some peo-
ple are doing reasonably well for themselves, they forget their own
vulnerabilities and become passive beholders of the humiliation of
others and the breaking of promises made to them. They are compla-
cent about injustice when it is not inflicted on them. In other words,
they choose peace with injustice. A commonly offered excuse or
dodge is that "life's unfair," a fatalistic evasion that redefines injustice
as unavoidable misfortune-in effect, bad luck. ["T]he difference be-
tween misfortune and injustice," Judith Shklar Writes, "frequently in-
volves our willingness and our capacity to act or not to act on behalf
of the victims, to blame or absolve, to help, mitigate, and compensate,
or to just turn away.' 161 If we can prevent or oppose wrongs but are
simply indifferent and do nothing, we contribute to injustice. This
"passive injustice" goes beyond the usual legalistic or adjudicatory
model which defines injustice as the violation of established rules by
actively unjust people. It recognizes that the inactive or passive con-
tribute to injustice by turning away from actual and potential victims
and letting matters take their course.
Labor lawyer Thomas Geoghegan writes in his book, Which Side
Are You On? that he saw a group of Korean women carrying picket
signs in his neighborhood and learned he had been living next to a
cramped windowless sweatshop employing Latino, Filipino, and Ko-
158. Id.
159. Id. at 256.
160. Id. at 257.
161. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 2 (1990).
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rean women. 162 As he put it, "We pass[ed] them all the time and
d[id]n't even notice."' 63 The women had been fired.164 On his way to
work each day, he and the condo owners on the Elevated platform
above would look down on them with compassion but all knew "that
the women below were doomed.' 65 Geoghegan concluded: "there is
just Big Business, Big Labor, and the Rest of Us. And the Rest of Us
are like the Swiss, we are morally neutral with our Swiss passports. A
strike even in our neighborhoods is none of our business.' 66 When
others' rights are being violated, however, moral neutrality is passive
injustice.
By the end of the summer, the Korean women were no longer
there and Geoghegan never saw them again: ["t]hey probably have
jobs now in other sweatshops, and they will never try this union stuff
again."'1 67 That is one of the hidden but most pernicious consequences
of passive injustice: that those suffering injustice will do nothing
about it because they are afraid to stand up alone with no support
from others. This means, as Judith Shklar says, "we may never really
know the extent of both the injustices and the sense of injustice that
prevail among us. Much is silent, forgotten, or locked away, which
allows us to resign ourselves to them.' 68
Justice requires all of us to use our power, including our political
power, to prevent wrongs being done to others. Although might does
not make right, it does take might to get right done. In The Grapes of
Wrath, a tenant farmer is bulldozed off his land by a driver who is just
as poor and helpless as he is, but desperate for the three dollars he is
earning to feed his children.169 The two tried unsuccessfully to deter-
mine whom or what to blame for what was happening to them.170 As
his shack was being crushed, the tenant shouted, "We all got to figure.
There's some way to stop this. It's not like lightning or earthquakes.
We've got a bad thing made by men, and by God that's something we
can change."' 17'
What has happened to the promises of the NLRA and the OSH
Act is a "bad thing" because some have been permitted to benefit
162. See GEOGHEGAN, supra 63, at 273.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 273-74.
166. Id. at 274.
167. Id.
168. SHKLAR, supra note 161, at 112.
169. See JoHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 38-39 (1939).
170. See id.
171. Id. at 39.
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through their unjust exploitation of others-by denying them their
right to participate in the workplace decisions affecting their lives and
subordinating their right to safe and healthful workplaces to consider-
ations of profit. This involves more than differences of opinion among
advocates for particular values. It involves more fundamental ques-
tions than whether the benefits for employers of breaking the
promises of the NLRA and the OSHA outweigh the resultant burdens
placed on workers.
The basic foundation of law is moral choice and the moral choices
set forth in the NLRA and the OSH Act as well as the moral choices
made in breaking the promises of these statutes concern fundamental
human rights as well as statutory rights. The underlying principles
used to justify breaking the promises "reduce all human behavior to
market behavior and all human values to the maximization of
wealth.' 72 In a democracy, in particular, the moral choices that con-
stitute the basic foundation of law must be made in ways that protect
and empower those most in need of protection173 -as the NLRA and
the OSH Act promised to do. Yet, the currently dominant values
favor the already powerful, wealthy, and better off at the expense of
those most in need of protection. Those dominant values also ignore
or disdain distributive and social justice.
In many ways, therefore, the redefinition of NLRA and OSH Act
issues depends on what we do about it. Contrary to what Adam Smith
and his disciples say, only visible hands can repair the damage of re-
cent decades so that the promises of the NLRA and OSH Act can be
kept.
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